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Summary 
This article investigates the effects of contingent payments and a traceability system’s 
expected traceback rate of success on the food safety effort exerted by raw material 
suppliers. This sheds light on when contingent payments and the reliability of a traceability 
system are substitutes and complements to each other in terms of inducing raw material 
suppliers to exert higher food safety effort. In addition, the effect of higher penalties and 
costs of food safety crisis on the effort to be induced by buyers (principal) on suppliers 
(agents) is investigated under a symmetric information setting. Finally, the asymmetric 
information setting is formalized as a principal-agent model and left to be explored in a 
future work. Some numerical exercises are carried out to illustrate main findings. It has 
been found that more reliable traceability systems might induce higher food safety efforts 
by suppliers. However, this same effect could be accomplished either with higher payments 
whenever no food safety crisis occurs or with lower payments whenever a food safety crisis 
occur both assuming the traceability system works. Finally, it is shown that without a 
traceability system in place no incentive scheme could be implemented. 
 
KEYWORDS: Information Asymmetry, Identity Preservation, Food Traceability, Supply 
Chain Management. 
JEL: D82, D86, C61. 
1. Introduction   
Following high profile food safety problems, worldwide public and private initiatives 
aiming at traceability system implementation have come to the forefront. The European 
Union and Japan made cattle traceability a public good by imposing mandatory systems 
after a series of mad cow disease outbreaks. Important exporters like Australia have started 
national mandatory traceability systems as a means of maintaining or enhancing export 
market shares. 
In the US, private voluntary traceability systems have been the most common practice. 
Three primary objectives have motivated firms in the US food sector to develop, 
implement, and maintain traceability systems (i) to differentiate market foods with 
credence attributes, (ii) to improve supply chain management, and (iii) to facilitate tracing 
back for food safety and quality (Golan et al., 2004). Thus, to improve food safety is only 
one of the reasons motivating firms to voluntarily adopt a traceability system. Regarding 
this, Hobbs (2004) identifies that a traceability system may be used to strengthen liability 
incentives (liability function). This article will focus specifically on the liability function of 
a traceability system in the context of food safety. 
In order to understand the liability function of a traceability system, it makes necessary to 
stress the differences between traceability systems and procedures such as Pathogen 
Reduction
1 (PR) and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
2 (HACCP). Unlike PR and 
HACCP approaches, a traceability system does not aim at direct interventions in 
                                                           
1Examples of innovative and effective technologies for limiting carcass contamination and pathogen reduction are 
carcass steam pasteurization, spray-washing, irradiation and chemical interventions (Vitiello and Thaler, 2001: p. 
600). 
2Notermans et al. (1994: p. 204) defines HACCP as a systematic approach to the control of potential hazards in a 
food by identifying problems before they occur, and establishing measures for their control at the stages in 
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procedures and processes to improve quality and safety controls. Even if changes in a 
production line are necessary, for example to limit raw material mixing (Antle 2001, p: 
1103), the ultimate goal of a traceability system is to accumulate information about product 
attributes, including safety and origin, as the product moves through the supply chain 
(Starbird and Amanor-Boadu, 2006). Thus, the information stored in a food traceability 
system is not expected, by itself, to lead to an improvement in food safety. To influence 
food safety, this information must be used either to remove unsafe food that is already in 
the supply chain, or to prevent unsafe food from ever entering the supply chain. For 
instance, in the event of a food product recall
3, the information stored in a traceability 
system may be used to backward trace to uncover the source of the problem, and to forward 
trace to find all other products and instances that have the same undesired properties 
(Jansen-Vuller et al. 2003). Thus, a more rapid and precise withdrawal of dangerous food 
products from the supply chain can be performed, ultimately reducing the probability by 
which consumers are exposed to contaminated food product.  
Since traceability creates the opportunity of determining responsibilities whenever a food 
crisis event occurs, the effectiveness of tort liability law as an incentive for firms may be 
improved (Hobbs 2004). Indeed, most opponents of mandatory introduction of traceability 
(e.g. a national animal identification system) mention increased liability as a primary 
concern (Souza-Monteiro and Caswell 2004; Golan et al. 2004).  
A traceability system might be used in a food supply chain as one of the pieces of incentive 
mechanisms, connecting the reward and punishment of raw material suppliers with 
observed safety of the food. It would be expected that by making incentive mechanisms 
feasible to be implemented, a traceability system can indirectly change the probability by 
which a food product is safe for consumption by enticing agents to exert more food safety 
efforts. In other words, it is hypothesized that a traceability system might be voluntarily 
employed by food processors to prevent unsafe food from entering the supply chain by 
motivating raw material suppliers to produce and deliver safer food. In this context, one of 
the issues addressed in the present article is whether a more reliable traceability system 
could be taken by the final consumer as a signal that a safer food has been produced.  
This article objective is to shed light on the following issues: What is the relationship 
between traceability reliability and food safety? Are contingent payments and the reliability 
of a traceability system substitutes or complements? How do penalties and costs of food 
safety crisis affect the level of efforts on food safety? 
2. Background 
Research related to the effect of information asymmetry on food safety and quality has 
developed in two directions: (1) to study the effect of using a noisy grading or testing 
technology to infer producers' behaviors regarding their investment in product quality 
(adverse selection issue), (2) to investigate the use of a noisy grading or testing technology 
as a tool to create incentive mechanisms driving the level of effort on product quality and 
safety by producers.  
As an example of the first group of works, Hennessy (1996) constructs a conceptual model 
wherein food processors test raw material supplied by producers as a method to protect 
their reputation in the consumer marketplace.  Using this model Hennessy shows that as a 
result of measurement errors in testing and grading a price-grade incentive is incapable of 
producing market equilibrium where the first-best level of investment in quality by 
producers is attained.  As a solution to the underinvestment in quality by producers, he 
advocates that processors and producers vertically integrate or source via product contracts.   
                                                           
3A food recall is a voluntary action by a manufacturer or distributor to protect the public from products that may 
cause health problems or possible death . Teratanavat and Hooker (2004) present a broad review of the 
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Along this same line of reasoning, Chalfant et al. (1999) argue that imperfect verification of 
quality may be mitigated by grading.  However, incentives based on an imperfect grade 
will not be strong enough to induce producers to incur first-best investments in higher value 
product.   The reason for this is that incentives to produce high quality raw material are 
lowered because grading a lower quality product as being of higher quality (type II error in 
grading) is a feasible event.    
Bogetoft and Olesen (2003) also study the effect of using a noisy grading technology to 
infer producers' behaviors regarding investing in product quality.   They show that the 
results obtained by Hennessy (1996) and Chalfant et al. (1999) hold only for a perfectly 
competitive market structure where trade occurs after grading (a posteriori competition) but 
does not necessarily hold for a competitive setting where all trade occurs before grading (a 
priori competition).  
As examples of the second group of works, Dubois and Vukina (2004) adapt the closed 
form solution for a principal-agent (PA) model with linear contracts, normally distributed 
measurement errors and agents’ exponential utility to econometrically estimate farmers' 
degree of risk aversion in contracting production of hogs.   Their results give empirical 
evidence that agents’ degree of risk aversion constrain the set of possible incentive 
mechanisms to be offered by the principal to agents as predicted by the PA model.  Starbird 
(2005) examines the effect of inspection policies set by the principal on the efforts exerted 
by producers (agents) concerning product safety.   His findings support the idea that 
inspection policies are effective tools for improving food safety.   King, Backus and Gaag 
(2007) develop and apply a dynamic principal-agent model for salmonella control in pork 
production in the Netherlands.   In their model the principal offers a contract to the agent 
specifying the frequency at which the agent's hogs will be tested on delivery, the share of 
the expected testing cost paid by producer, and the level of penalty per hog for a salmonella 
prevalence test that exceeds a tolerance level pre-defined by the principal.   The main 
contribution of this article is to show that reputation-based contracts affect agents' behavior.  
A common characteristic of all previous studies is that at the time a signal correlated with 
an agent's action is observed, the principal knows the agent's identity.  This is certainly the 
case when raw material is tested on delivery.  However, once the processing of the raw 
material starts, unobservable characteristics of the raw material on delivery might become 
observable, but by this time the identity of the raw material supplier is likely to have been 
separated from the processed product.   
3. Conceptual  Framework 
In general terms, a traceability system is composed of a series of procedures by which the 
identification, preparation, collection, storage, and verification of data are performed. A 
system like this accumulates information about product attributes, including safety and 
origin, as the product moves through the supply chain (Starbird and Amonor-Boadu 2006).  
Like any other information system, a traceability system is expected to fail with some 
frequency. Therefore, a traceability system investigated in the present article is fully 
characterized by its expected traceback rate of success in preserving information about the 
supplier’s identity attached to the final food product. Hence, the unique information 
maintained by this traceability system is the identity of the supplier of the raw material, 
which gives the traceability system's breadth
4. This information should be kept attached to 
the food product along its processing and packing. In other words, the identity of raw 
material suppliers should remain attached to the food product from the delivery of the raw 
materials up until the final product is sold to final consumers. Therefore, every traceability 
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system's depth
5 in the present article is assumed to be from delivery of raw materials to the 
consumption of the final food product. Moreover, in the context of the present article a 
traceability system’s precision
6 will be 100% whenever it properly works in keeping the 
identity of a raw material supplier attached to the final food product, and zero otherwise.  
It is hypothesized that a food processor, retailer, or wholesaler (the principal or buyer) 
purchases raw materials from a group of homogeneous growers or supplier (the agents or 
suppliers) to run a one-time project. Notice that, if the buyer were sourcing from only one 
supplier, a traceability system as conceptualized in the present article would be useless. 
But, because the buyer sources from many homogeneous suppliers, he/she is not able to 
keep track of suppliers' identity along food processing without using a traceability system. 
Thus, this traceability system in place will make it possible for the principal to associate, 
with a certain probability of success, the safety of the final food product to the safety of the 
raw material delivered by a supplier. This makes it feasible, with some probability of 
success, either to punish or to reward a raw material supplier based on the observed safety 
of the final food product, even after a transaction has occurred.   
Given the above context, the principal and each agent play a two-stage sequential game that 
will run as shown in Figure 1. The buyer is the first mover, choosing and committing to the 
payment scheme and the traceability system’s traceback rate of success. These two pieces 
together fully characterizes an incentive mechanism or contract. In sequence, each agent 
will be the second mover, choosing and then exerting the level of food safety effort as the 
best response to the contract offered by the principal. Finally the feasible contingencies are 
observed and income transfers will be made based on them. 
 
[Figure 1, Here] 
It is recognized that food safety problems occur due to many different causes. Despite this, 
I assume that a traceability system will never pinpoint a raw material supplier as the cause 
of a food safety crisis if this is not the case. Further, I take into account only food safety 
problems that might be originated at farm level. In other words, I assume that the 
principal's level of effort has no effect on the safety of the final product (e.g. the chances of 
observing excessive concentration of growth hormone in meat and broken syringe needles 
from health treatments depend only on the effort exerted by growers).  
4. Probabilities in the Model 
The traceability system is assumed to fail with certain frequency. Thus, if the identity of the 
raw material supplier will remain attached to the final food product is a random event. In 
addition, the safety of a food product will be also a random event. This is because there are 
other factors, out of agents’ control, influencing the safety of the raw material supplied by 
them (e.g. human mistakes and failures in machinery can occur even in a context in which 
high effort has been exerted on food safety). Given all this, for the setting in which a 
traceability system is in place and the effort exerted by suppliers are not observable 
(asymmetric information), the sample space is composed of a collection of 2-tuples 
formalized as: E = {(z1, z2): z1= 0 or 1, z2=0 or 1}, where z1 equals 1 if the traceability 
system works in tracing back the identity of a raw material supplier, otherwise 0; and z2 
equals 1 if the raw material supplied by an agent does not cause a food product lot to be 
unsafe for consumption, otherwise 0. 
I denote the expected frequency by which the traceability system will properly trace back 
the identity of an input supplier by s. Finally, the probability, F(z2=1|a), that the raw 
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2004). 
6 Precision represents the system's ability to pinpoint the original source of a problem 
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material supplied by an agent will not cause a food product lot to be unsafe for 
consumption, given the supplier has exerted the level of effort a, is represented as F(a). 
Given those definitions, the probabilities of every feasible contingency in the asymmetric 
information setting with traceability are summarized in table 1. 
[Table 1 - Here] 
5. The Supplier’s Objective Function 
As one of the steps in setting an incentive mechanism, the buyer should determine 
contingent income transfers to be offered to each agent. In doing so, the buyer knows that 
there is no means of making transfers contingent on the safety of the food product 
whenever the agent’s identity is lost during food processing. Hence, let I0 be the income to 
be transferred to a supplier whenever the traceability system does not work, regardless of 
the safety of the food product lot (contingency 0). However, whenever the traceability 
system works it will be possible for the principal to make income transfers, as dollar per 
delivered lot, contingent on the safety of the final product. Thus, let I1 stand for the income 
transfer to an agent whenever the traceability system works and no food safety problem is 
observed (contingency 1). In addition, let I2 be the income transfer to the Agent whenever 
the traceability system works and at least one food safety problem associated with the raw 
material is observed (contingency 2). To sum up, there will be an income transfer (Im) to a 
supplier in dollars per lot delivered in each contingency m∈M with M = {0, 1, 2} as shown 
in Table 1.  
I assume that a supplier’s preferences can be represented by a utility function whose 
arguments are the contingent transfer (Im) and the level of effort (a) exerted by supplier. 
Following Holmstrom (1979), Tirole (1988), Goodhue (2000), and Starbird (2005), it is 
assumed additive separability between the utility of income and the disutility of effort by 
letting the agent’s utility function U: ℜ
2→ ℜ be of the functional form given as:   
 (1)   U(Im, a)=u(Im)-d(a)   
where U(.) is a von Neuman Morgenstern utility function and u(.) is a Bernoulli utility 
function as defined by Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1996: p. 184), d(.) is a utility 
function for effort
7.  This type of von Neuman Morgenstern utility functional form imposes 
independence of agent’s preferences over income lotteries and perfectly certain actions 
(Haubrich, 1994). 
Given equation (1), a supplier’s expected utility for a given incentive mechanism (s, I0, I1, I 
2) and level of effort (a) is given as: 
(2) U(s, I0, I1, I 2,a)= (1-s)u(I0)+sF(a)u(I1)+s(1-F(a))u(I2)-d(a)   
where s denotes the traceability system’s expected rate of success in tracing back the source 
of the raw material; F (a) is a continuously differentiable cumulative density function 
(CDF) in an agent's effort with its first and second derivatives following Fa>0 and Faa<0. 
These assumptions assure that the probability of a safe food product is increasing and that 
the marginal probability of a safe food product is decreasing both on agent’s effort (see 
Tirole 1988: p.54). 
6. The Supplier’s Problem 
To deal with the question on the relationship between traceability system reliability and the 
degree of food safety, it suffices to look at the problem faced by the supplier of raw 
material. In the sequence, the problem of the principal will be formalized and investigated 
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in order to deal with the effect of increased costs with food safety crisis on the level of food 
safety to be induced by the principal on agents. 
The supplier of raw material or agent wants to maximize his/her expected utility, choosing 
the level of effort to be exerted, taking as given the incentive mechanism (s, I0, I1, I 2) set by 
the principal. Therefore, the agent’s problem is formalized as (4): 
(4) max
a
 (1-s)u(I0)+sF(a)u(I1)+s(1-F(a))u(I2)-d(a)  
The necessary condition for an interior solution to (4) is: 
(5)  sFa(u(I1)-u(I2))-da=0 
Notice that if the reliability of the traceability system is zero, then the best response for a 
supplier is to exert the level of effort that makes da=0.  In other words, if a traceability 
system is not in place, a supplier’s best response is to exert the level of effort that implies 
the lowest disutility for him/her. 
 
The sufficient condition for an interior solution to (4) is: 
(6)  sFaa(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa<0 
Let’s say that the principal will pay more for preferable contingences, which implies that 
u(I1)-u(I2)>0. Moreover, if s∈(0,1],  Faa<0, and d aa>0 the sufficient condition is 
automatically fulfilled.  
Rearranging (5), an interior maximum is found to exist if: 
(7) sFa(u(I1)-u(I2))= da 
The left-hand side of (7) gives the marginal utility of food safety effort for a supplier. This 
supplier’s marginal benefit stems from the reduction in the probability of a food safety 
crisis as long as more food safety effort is exerted. The right-hand side of (7) gives the 
marginal disutility coming with more effort being exerted by a supplier. In other words, at 
an optimum level of effort (a*) the marginal benefit of effort should equal its marginal cost.  
7. Traceability, Incentive Scheme and the Supply 
of Safe Food 
I assume that the maximizer for the problem (4) is a continuously differentiable function of 
traceability system’s reliability, and the income transfers in contingencies 0, 1 and 2, such 
that a*=f(s, I0, I1, I2). Given this, how will the optimal level of effort chosen by the supplier 
of raw material change with respect to the arguments of f(.)? 
First, what is the effect on a* of a more reliable traceability system?  
Taking the derivative of (5) at the point a*=f(s, I0, I1, I2) with respect to s results that 
Fa(u(I1)-u(I2))+sFaa(∂ a*/∂ s)(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa(∂ a*/∂ s)=0, which implies that: 
(8) ∂ a*/∂ s=- Fa(u(I1)-u(I2))/(sFaa(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa) 
It is known from (6) that the denominator in the right-hand side of (8) is negative. This fact 
implies that ∂ a*/∂ s>0. In other words, a more reliable traceability system induces more 
effort by the raw material suppliers, everything else remaining constant. 
Second, what is the effect on a* if an incentive scheme offers higher income transfers for 
the contingency wherein the traceability system works and no food safety crisis is 
observed?  
To answer this question, I take the derivative of (5) with respect to I1 at the point a*=f(s, I0, 
I1, I2), which gives sFa(∂u(I1)/∂ I1)+sFaa(∂ a*/∂ I1)(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa(∂ a*/∂ I1)=0. Rearranging 
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(9) ∂ a*/∂ I1=- sFa(∂u(I1)/∂ I1)/(sFaa(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa) 
A supplier’s Bernoulli utility function is strictly increasing in income so that ∂u(I1)/∂ I1>0. 
Also, from (6) it is known that the denominator of (9) is negative. Therefore, it must be true 
that  ∂ a*/∂ I1>0. In other words, if everything else remains constant, an increase in the 
income to be transferred to suppliers under the contingency wherein the traceability system 
works and no food safety crisis is observed will induce more food safety effort by a 
supplier. 
Third, what is the effect on a* of higher income transfers under the contingency in which 
the traceability system works and a food safety crisis caused by the raw material supplied is 
observed?  
Taking the derivative of (5) at the point a*=f(s, I0, I1, I2) with respect to I2 results that  
-sFa(∂u(I1)/∂ I 2)+sFaa(∂ a*/∂ I 2)(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa(∂ a*/∂ I 2)=0. After rearranging terms, the 
following result shows up: 
(10) ∂ a*/∂ I2= sFa(∂u(I2)/∂ I2)/(sFaa(u(I1)-u(I2))-daa) 
Again, since ∂u(I2)/∂ I 2>0 and the denominator of (10) is negative, it will be true that         
∂ a*/∂ I2<0. In other words, if everything else remains constant, a reduction in the income 
to be transferred to suppliers under the contingency wherein the traceability system works 
and a food safety crisis is observed will induce more food safety effort by a supplier. 
Summing up, ∂ a*/∂ s>0, ∂ a*/∂ I1>0, ∂ a*/∂ I2<0. Based on these results, higher income 
transfers under the contingency in which the traceability system works and no food safety 
crisis caused by the raw material supplied is observed (I1) and lower income transfers under 
the contingency in which the traceability system works and a food safety crisis caused by 
the raw material supplied is observed (I2) are substitutes one to each other and also to 
higher traceability system reliability (s). Despite this, it is important to mention that there 
would not be any incentive for exerting food safety effort to raw material suppliers if either 
s were set equal to zero or if I1 were made equal to I2. In this sense, s, I1 and I2 are in some 
degree complements too. 
The role played by I0 is to make (1-s)u(I0)+sF(a*)u(I1)+s(1-F(a*))u(I2)-d(a*)>U. Where U 
denotes the reservation utility or the minimum expected utility a contract must offer to a 
supplier to assure that this same agent will accept the contract offered by the buyer. In other 
words, I 0 must be higher enough to assure that an interior solution (a*>0)  is feasible, 
otherwise the supplier will exert the lowest level of food safety effort available to him/her. 
Despite the fact that ∂ a*/∂ s>0, which indicates that the more reliable a traceability system 
is the higher the food safety effort exerted by suppliers will be, it is wrong to infer the 
safety of a food product based on the reliability of a buyer’s traceability system. This is 
because an incentive mechanism based on a traceability system with high reliability but that 
offers I1 and I2 such that (u(I1)-u(I2)) is low might be inducing low efforts by suppliers. In 
other words, a buyer could be inducing the same level of food safety efforts on suppliers by 
using a very reliable traceability system combined with low difference between I1 and I2. 
Putting another way, higher values for (I1-I2) might do the same job as making s closer to 
one. 
7.1. A Numerical Illustration 
To illustrate a supplier’s best response as given by formula (7), let the Bernoulli utility 
function for a supplier be CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) with the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion very close to zero so that u(Im)=ln(Im). Assume that the probability of 
no food safety crisis caused by the raw material supplied by a supplier is given as 
F(a)=0.5a
1/2 with a∈[0,4], and the disutility of effort is given as d(a)=0.5a
2. Parameterizing 
(4) with these functions and values results that the optimal food safety effort to be exerted 
by a supplier is given as a*=(sln(I1/I2)/2)
2/3 which complies with ∂ a*/∂ s>0, ∂ a*/∂ I1>0,      134
∂ a*/∂ I 2<0. For instance, the case in which I1=15, I2=0.1, s=0.8 which implies a*≈1 is 
illustrated with Figure 2.  
[Figure 2 - Here] 
8.  Investigating the Effect of Penalties and Costs of 
Food Safety Crisis on Food Safety Efforts 
I will star with the first-best or symmetric information setting characterized by agents’ 
actions being freely verifiable by the principal. As discussed before, the principal should set 
a payment scheme such that each agent will want to exert the effort level chosen by the 






(11b) u(I)-d(a) ≥  U  
where re is the external cost of a food safety crisis which includes the direct cost of liability, 
product recalls, allowances, court or market-imposed penalties and fines levied due to 
safety failures; (1-F(a))re is the measure of the negative externality an agent can cause on 
the principal; Finally, U  denotes the reservation utility or the minimum utility a contract 
must offer to an agent to assure that an agent will accept the contract (participation 
constraint). 
Given a level of effort, for instance the first-best level of food safety effort (aFB), the 
principal’s cost will increase with higher income transfers. Thus, it must be true that any 
income transfer greater than IFB  will result in higher costs to the principal. As a 
consequence of this, the participation constraint (11b) has to bind in an optimal solution for 
(11), which implies that: 
(12) IFB=v(U +d(aFB)) 
where v(.) denotes the inverse of the Bernoulli utility function u(.). 
By plugging (12) into (11a) and solving the unconstrained minimization problem for aFB, 
results that the first order condition will be given as: 
(13) ∂ v(U+d(aFB))/∂(U+d(aFB)) ∂d(aFB)/∂aFB -re∂F(aFB)/∂aFB=0 
Notice that the first-best level of effort is a function of re, aFB=aFB(re). Taking the derivative 






Since v′ (.)>0, v″(.)>0, d″(.)>0, Fa>0, and Faa<0, then it is possible to see from (14) that 
increased external cost of a food safety crisis will induce a buyer to contract higher level of 
effort under the first-best setting. Of course, this result holds assuming that an interior 
solution will still hold. In fact, if the cost of a food safety crisis becomes too high, a buyer 
could be better off producing nothing or even leaving the industry. 
8.1. The Model for the Asymmetric Information Setting 
with Traceability  
Having previously defined all the elements necessary to set the up the asymmetric 
information setting with traceability I will now set the principal-agent model with 
traceability as a mathematical programming problem.   135
The principal wants to minimize his/her expected cost incurred with the payment of raw 
material suppliers, with the costs of a traceability system and with the costs of a food safety 
crisis. In doing so, the principal chooses and offers to agents a contract (s, I0, I1, I 2) such 
that it will be in an agent’s best interest to accept the contract and to exert an action a. 
Ultimately, the principal-agent problem can be formalized as the program (15). 
(15a)
012 ,[ 0 , 1 ] ,,, min
as I I I ∈
(1-s)I0+sF(a)I1+s(1-F(a))I2+(1-F(a))re+g(s) 
Subject to: 
(15b) (1-s)u(I0)+sF(a)u(I1)+s(1-F(a))u(I2)-d(a) ≥ U  
(15c) sFa(u(I1)-u(I2))-da=0    (see Equation (7)) 
where g (.) denotes the cost of tracing a lot of raw material as a strictly increasing, 
continuously differentiable and convex function in s. All other terms have previously been 
defined.  
The first term in (15a) gives the expected cost of income transfers to a supplier (agent) per 
lot of food product or raw material whenever the food product is safe and the traceability 
system does not work. Without loss of generality I am assuming the one lot of raw material 
is necessary and sufficient to produce one lot of food product. The second term in (15a) 
stands for the expected cost of income transfers whenever a food safety crisis happens and 
the traceability system does not work. The third term in (15a) gives the expected cost of 
income transfers whenever the food product lot is safe and the traceability system works. 
The fourth term in (15a) gives the expected cost of a food safety crisis to the principal. 
Finally, the participation constraint is set as (15b) and the incentive compatibility constraint 
is given by (15c). 
Analytically solving program (15) is very complex. Therefore, I leave the principal-agent 
model set to indicate what future works could be dealing with this in order to answer, in 
more general terms, how “penalties and costs of food safety crisis” will affect the level of 
food safety to be chosen by the principal to induce agents to exert. 
9. Results 
This article formalizes the problem of inducing food safety efforts on suppliers of raw 
material in a context of information asymmetry. It is hypothesized that by making it 
possible to pass the cost of unsafe food to the source with some chance of success, a 
traceability system will motivate raw material suppliers to deliver safer inputs to a food 
processor.  
A principal-agent model is conceptually developed under the assumption that a buyer 
sources from many homogeneous suppliers in an information asymmetric word. Therefore, 
I first explore the supplier’s problem by deriving his/her best response function. Using the 
best response function, it is investigated the relationship between traceability reliability and 
food safety and the complementarity and substitutability between contingent payments and 
the reliability of a traceability system. I found substitutability among higher income 
transfers under the contingency in which the traceability system works and no food safety 
crisis caused by the raw material supplied is observed, lower income transfers under the 
contingency in which the traceability system works and a food safety crisis caused by the 
raw material supplied is observed, and higher traceability system reliability. Despite this, it 
is important to mention that there would not be any feasible incentive scheme if a 
traceability system either is not in place or never works. This feature gives the 
complementarity between contingent payments and traceability system’s reliability. It is 
defended that it is not reasonable to infer the safety of a food product on the basis of the 
reliability of a buyer’s traceability system. This is because contingent payments properly 
set can do the same job as a very reliable traceability system.   136
Finally, I investigate how penalties and costs of food safety crisis are important to make 
buyer to demand from suppliers high levels of food safety efforts. At least under the 
symmetric information setting, it has been found that increased external cost of a food 
safety crisis will induce a buyer to contract higher food safety level of effort. This same 
investigation under the asymmetric information setting was properly formalized but left for 
a future work. 
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Figures 




Figure 2. An illustration of the marginal utility function (sFa(u(I1)-u(I2))) and marginal disutility 
function of food safety efforts (da) for the case wherein I1=15, I2=0.1, s=0.8, 
u(Im)=ln(Im), F(a)=0.5a
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Table 1. Summary of Probabilities and Income Transfers in the Models 
Asymmetric Information Setting with a 
Traceability System in Place  Symmetric 
Information 
Setting  Traceability Works  Traceability does not 
Work 
Event 
Probability Probability  Income 
Transfer  Probability  Income 
Transfer 
The raw material 
supplied by the agent  
does not cause any 
food product lot to be 
unsafe for 
consumption 




(1-s)F(a)  I0 
At least one lot of 
food product is found 
as unsafe for 
consumption due to 
problems originated 
from the raw material 





(1-s)(1-F(a))  I0 
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